INTRODUCTION
Science-inspired naturalism is a challenge for religion since it presents a view of the world that differs from traditional religious images. (Drees 2003:596) Make no mistake: the challenge and the different view of the world is a given. However, it is the confusing theological question posed as the 'naturalness of religion' that has to be rephrased. (Daniël P. Veldsman) In the field of organisational development, structure usually follows strategy. For the effective running and well-being of an organisation, the implication is that it first has to get its house in order with regard to how it sees itself (or positions itself within a specific environment), where it wants to go and what goals it wants to realise. Thus having formulated a strategic plan (let me call it the process of mapping), the organisation subsequently is structured.
Following this organisational dictum (as a positive directive), I want to translate it (as a negative problematising of the theme) theologically with regard to the question on the naturalness of religion and the challenge that it brings (as quoted by Drees), as follows: sense-making (or perhaps conceptualisation?) follows semantic mapping. My 'translation' from an organisational context to a theological context is perhaps not so good (at this stage), but I trust that at least it captures the basic thrust of the problem that I want to raise. 1 I acknowledge that the density, width and depth of the issue at hand are surely not fully covered in this formulation. Certainly not. This can easily be substantiated in reference to -amongst others -the international project of the Ian Ramsey Centre (Oxford University) on the question of religion as natural human behaviour as well as recent influential publications on the naturalness of religion, such as Barrett's Exploring the natural foundations of religion (2000) ; Religion explained: The human instincts that fashion gods, spirits and ancestors (2001) by Pascal Boyer and his article 'Why is religion natural? ' (2004) , there is also a strong contingent of supporters for the 'there is no natural religion' viewpoint.
2 Although I will not be able to cover the full spectrum and all dimensions of the question on the naturalness of religion I would still like to pursue the question with my formulated directive. The problem that I would like to address is twofold: firstly, how can a question be posed (on the naturalness of religion) consisting of two concepts (religion and naturalness) that are not so clear 3 and secondly, what are the implications of the preceding semantic mappings (or labelling) that determine the sensemaking process (that is, the conceptual problems that follow in the wake of the labelling)? In this paper my only aim is to try to clarify the twofold problem that is posed, that is: to reflect on the two concepts that make up the question, namely firstly natural and secondly religion and finally to indicate what is meant by semantic mappings that determine conceptual problems. From this indication I want to argue that 'scientific foul play' is the order of the day, that is, that both theology and science are as it were playing off-side, thus making the question in the contemporary discourses an emotionally messy endeavour and that, in my opinion, the question therefore has to be rephrased.
1.In his discussion of naturalism, Drees (2003:594) formulates the point that I am pursuing as follows: 'Explanations of facts always assume an explanatory framework of laws and earlier conditions'.
2.Perhaps the famous debate on natural theology between the two German scholars Karl Barth and Emil Brunner can be mentioned in this regard. It is especially Barth's negative stance which has influenced much of the reflection within Reformed circles on nature and natural.
3.Chris Wiltsher (2010) in his paper Can religion be natural? and Dirk Evers (2010) in his What's religion for? posed the very same question regarding the problematic and unclear understanding of the two concepts.
ON THE 'NATURALNESS' OF NATURAL
More than a decade ago, the American philosopher-theologian Philip Clayton argued in God and contemporary science (1997) that the issue regarding the presumption of naturalism -that is, the assumption that the cause of any event in the natural world is a natural one as opposed to a supernatural one -is not whether there is any presumption of naturalism, but how strong we should make it and in which areas we should regard it to be strongest (cf. Clayton 1997:171-172 The concept 'natural' is utilised in many contexts (philosophy, ethics, sociology, physics, etc.) . What is immediately clear is that the varied contexts determine its varied meanings. 4 Furthermore it is also utilised as an indication of a specific style in art, literature and theatre. Danto (1967) (Danto 1967:448) The key conviction is thus that the entire knowable universe is composed of natural objects; 5 key concepts are natural causes, natural processes, natural methods and natural explanations (Danto 1967:448-449; Post 1999:596-597 ), but also self-contained and self-dependent! In short: the natural world is the whole of reality. In a philosophical-theological context a naturalist is one who holds that there is nothing over and above nature. A naturalist, says Alston (1967a:145) , is committed to rejecting traditional religion which is based on beliefs in the supernatural. 6 Justifiably the Dutch philosopher Willem Drees (2003:593) mentions that naturalism arouses strong emotions. He states that some see it as a banner to follow whereas others see it as an enemy to fight. Drees continues by asserting that at the same time the concept represents a clear and unified category until one begins to think and read about it. This is precisely where the process to problematise the question will start.
4.See also, for example, the exposition of Mocek (1990:508) of the concept of nature in the Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften where he speaks of 'nature' as a 'Sammelbegriff zur Bezeichnung von Bereichen der Wirklichkeit, die ohne menschliches Zutun entstehen bzw. existieren. In diesem Sinnne wird Natur auch als Gegenbegriff zu den Begriffen "Kultur" bzw. "Gesellschaft" verwendet'. He then adds the important historical remark: 'Als philosophische Kategorie ist Natur über zwei-einhalb Jahrtausende mit verschiedensten Bedeutungen belegt, wobei die im frühen griechischen Denken auftauchenden zwei Grundbestimmungeneinmal auf das Werden der Dinge gerichtet, zum anderen auf ihre Beschaffenheit, auf ihre Wesensart -vielfältige Interpretationen erfahren haben'.
5.In
The dictionary of philosophy (cf. www.ditext.com/runes/n.html#Naturalism) it is formulated as follows: 'Naturalism … holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government, but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing, that the world-process is not teleological and anthropocentric, but purposeless, deterministic and only incidentally productive of man …'.
6.Cf. Alston (1967a:145) for a clear explanation on the naturalist's position regarding religion that does not necessarily carry with it the rejection of religion as such. He states that many naturalists envisage a substitute for traditional religion which will perform the typical functions of religions without making any claims beyond the natural world.
In Many interesting and dated convictions mixed together make up Boas' perspective on nature, but what is important here are his remarks about 'setting the standards', the 'antithetical' as basis for the understanding of the term and the 'usual' consideration that the supernatural is better than the natural. That nature is the 'norm for setting the standards' (in whatever way it is understood) for the individual and for society are still semantically very operational. The unavoidable critical question is this: Who is setting which standards for whom and where? That the supernatural is to be considered better has surely not only been overturned, but has given rise in many contexts of reflection to the significance of evolutionary epistemology, to have been erased from 'sense-making' mapping altogether. However, does this also imply that its methodological erasure (that is, of the concept 'supernatural') has done away with it its original 'antithetical' defining of the concept of nature from earlier generations? Or does the concept 'natural' today still carries with it a definite ideological residue of its earlier 'definition', but now minus the reference to supernatural that 'originally' determined its definition? How is this antithetical natural-supernatural relationship to be understood?
The semantic mapping of 'supernatural' (in opposition to that which is regarded as natural) is rather a 'latecomer' in the cultural history of the West (cf. Ward 2003:846) and its meaning and history depends entirely upon the order that it seems to supersede. 8 The early church fathers hesitated to use the word, due to its older semantic resonance with the word 'natural', that is, the natural as the human condition without sin, the pristine state in which was manifested the untarnished image of God (Ward 2003:846 ) -and such a natural condition was to be redeemed, not superseded. Although early cosmology did indeed conceive of realms, powers and principalities beyond the mundane, it was coined in a different semantic framework (e.g. ouranios / uperouranios / uperkosmios / supermandalis with its nature, i.e. its celestial essence, as uperousios, translated in Latin as supersubstantialis or superessentialis). Ward (2003:846-847) explains insightfully that up to the 17th century, despite the current dualistic cosmology, the transit between the above and the below constituted a continuum. But then it changed with the terminological introduction of 'supernatural':
With supernaturalis a distinction was being made such that … any incursions from the supernatural realm were understood as raptures of the natural order. As such, supernaturalis could only gain currency as that which was naturalis came to be understood as the order of things in the postlapsarian, rather than the prelapsarian, world. (Ward 2003:847) And the theological consequences? Against the historical background of the contribution of especially Thomas Aquinas, 7. Drees (2003:594) puts it as follows: 'Naturalism sees social and mental life as one of the fruits of the long evolutionary process'.
8. Ward (2003:846) refers to the French theologian Henri de Lubac, who has provided a significant history of the transmission of the word. De Lubac informs us that it was only in the 9th century that the Latin word supernaturalis entered theology. Even then its usage was rare until the middle of the 13th century and it did not come into standard use until after the Council of Trent in the middle of the 16th century (Ward 2003:846) .
the distinction between knowledge on the basis of revelation and knowledge on the basis of observation led increasingly to a division of intellectual labour and the examination of things created took on an independence that ultimately led to the establishment of 'Nature' (Ward 2003:847) . 9 'Supernatural' became that which transcends the natural and is superior to the natural insofar as it is more powerful in being more spiritual (cf. Boas 1967:346; Ward 2003:847) . However, this has changed dramatically. According to Abrams (cited in Ward 2003:847) , the contemporary understanding of the supernatural is a cultural product of early romanticism and the processes of secularisation.
10 Why secularisation? Because it brought about the demythologisation of human experience. But this process went hand in hand with the process of 'disenchantment' (Max Weber) brought about by the technological calculation and manipulation, that is, through the systematic rationalisation, of observable phenomena (Ward 2003:847) . Thus we have a very different framework for understanding nature or natural, namely nature as the objectivist realm and natural as that which presents itself to the senses and can therefore be examined by the empirical sciences. It was a framework that gave rise to a spectrum of oppositions: subject and object; natural and cultural; private and public; the freedom of enlightenment and the dangerous darkness of ignorance (Ward 2003:848) . The term 'supernatural' was now to be understood based upon these new binaries, that is, as the opposite of the natural (i.e. irrational; disordered; a realm of darkness; ignorance and superstition), as that which stood outside of the rational and integrated orders of nature.
However, post-modernity has brought about a new thrust in Western religiosity. A thrust -which I would like to vaguely call the re-emergence of religiosity -as cultural shift with respect not only to the credibility of the supernatural but also to its interface with the everyday (cf. Ward 2003:848) . Reenchantment is emerging in many different ways over a wide cultural spectrum.
11 But, in my opinion, this re-enchantment has first to be freed from its historical negative definition (i.e. supernatural as irrational opposite to nature) before we can pursue the question at hand, namely the naturalness of religion. But before I would like to formulate pointers in this regard, we first have to turn briefly to the concept 'religion'.
HOW 'RELIGIOUS' IS RELIGION?
The concept 'religion' immediately reminds of the well-known tactic of students of religion to cite the appendix of James H Leuba's Psychological study of religion (1912) , which lists more than fifty definitions of religion, to demonstrate that the effort to define religion is a hopeless task (cf. Bowker 1997:xvff; Smith 1998:281) . However, Smith (1998:281) convincingly responds, albeit short and sweet: 'Not at all!' This is not to say that religion cannot be defined. It can be defined with greater or lesser success more than fifty times. The crucial point that Smith (1998) emphasises is that religion is not a native term, but a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and is therefore theirs to define.
12 He states:
[Religion] is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as 'language' plays in linguistics or 'culture' plays in anthropology.
There can be no disciplined study of religion without such a horizon. (Smith 1998:281-282) 9. Ward (2003:847) explains that by the time of the Council of Trent, 'nature' was becoming an autonomous, rule-governed realm open for systematic enquiry, manipulation and improvement.
10.See the exposition of Ward (2003:847) in which he indicates with modernity and the .See the exposition of Ward (2003:847) in which he indicates with modernity and the authority given to human reasoning, the increasing exploration and cataloguing of the natural world and with the continuing Protestant attacks upon superstition, the world became secularised.
11. Ward (2003:848) talks about the resurgence of the gothic imagination -about the . Ward (2003:848) talks about the resurgence of the gothic imagination -about the cyborg, the clone, the alien, the android and cyberspace games.
12.See, however, the valid criticism of Auffarth and Mohr (2006:1613) (King 1987:283) For Smith (1998) , the anthropological definition of religion that has gained widespread assent among scholars of religion who both share and reject its functionalist frame is that religion is an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings (Spiro). He adds the following explanation:
This definition requires acceptance of a broad theory of cultural creation, signaled by the phrase 'culturally patterned' and 'culturally postulated' and places human cultural activities or institutions as the summum genus and religion as a subordinate
taxon. (Smith 1998:281) According to Smith (1998) , subsequent reformulations by scholars of religion have tended either to remove this subordination (e.g. Penner) or to substitute 'supernatural' for 'superhuman' (e.g. Stark & Bainbridge). In this regard, Rodrigues and Harding (2009) Smith (1998:269ff) in which he carefully explains the .See the insightful exposition of Smith (1998:269ff) in which he carefully explains the historical-semantic movements with regard to 'religion' (in relation to ritual practice), 'religions' (in relation to the existence of a multitude of articulations of religion) and 'religious' (in relation to the human experience or activity that it modifies). See also Auffrath and Mohr (2006:1608ff) , who adds an important qualification in which they state that the word (religion) that so self-evidently escapes our lips in Europe and America today has a long history and a history principally European. Ahn (1997:514) also emphasises the 'eurozentrischen Denkkategorien' that determines the historical-philosophical research of religion.
14.Interestingly Auffrath and Mohr (2006:1611-2) 
SEMANTIC MAPPING DETERMINING CONCEPTUALISATION: CONFUSION AND FOUL PLAY
In the light of the preceding exposition, I would like to argue that the question on the naturalness of religion should be rephrased for three reasons. It should be rephrased firstly because of the complete lack of any scholarly consensus whatsoever regarding the two terms and secondly, because the historical semantic mapping (natural or religion) has left a confusing ideological residue on the contemporary conceptualisation of the question and thirdly, because it has given rise to, what I would like to call, scientific foul play, which finds expression in contemporary emotionally messy discourses on the relationship between science and theology.
Given the preceding exposition of the semantic mapping of 'natural' and 'religion' which unmasked a complete lack of scholarly consensus (cf. Evers 2010; Wiltsher 2010), I cannot avoid to conclude that the combination of natural plus religion in the phrase 'naturalness of religion' adds up to a non-sensible phrase. The question is highly questionable (non-sensible?) although it seems on the semantic surface to make complete sense. Clayton's acceptance of the presumption of naturalism is not so unproblematic after all (see page XX).
The confusing ideological residue with regard to 'nature' and 'natural' lies in its historically formed binary opposition to supernatural (observation vs revelation; rational vs irrational; order vs disorder, etc.), leaving us with a understanding of 'nature' as the objectivist realm, as the norm (paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences) for setting the (scientific) standards and 'natural' as that which presents itself to the senses and could therefore be examined by the empirical sciences. It repudiates the view that there exist any entities which lie in principal beyond the scope of scientific explanation. I call this the ideological residue which permeates the semantic mapping of nature and naturalness and which subsequently determines the conceptualisation that flows from them. The residue can be labelled from the perspective of the philosophy of science as 'positivism', that is, the epistemological perspective from which all (true and universal) knowledge is solely based on observation. However, after Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms and Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemological approach and the injection of Darwinism into philosophy of science, such a perspective is no longer tenable. It has opened a wide spectrum of new discourses on the evolution of human cognition, that is, that human rationality and therefore all reflection and knowledge are shaped and constrained by its deeper biological roots (cf. Van Huyssteen 2007:1) . The theoryladenness and paradigm dependency of knowledge have since opened our eyes to the interpretative, hermeneutical dimension of all knowledge.
But it is not only the 'positivist' residue which clouds the problematic semantic mapping. Many theological traditions, in addressing the science-inspired naturalistic challenge (Drees 2003) , has (methodologically and a-contextually) turned the older (antithetical) semantic resonance of natural as the human condition without sin into varied immunisation strategies, finding expression in (amongst others) contemporary fundamentalist approaches such as creationism and creationism light (intelligent design). Such pseudo-scientific-theological strategies are not only harmful to the integrity of theological discourses, but ignores the very exciting new space of interdisciplinary discourses that springs forth from the very illuminating insights of the interpretative, hermeneutical dimension of all knowledge.
If, as was stated earlier, the new thrust in Western religiosity (i.e. the re-emergence of religiosity) is to be appreciated theologically and a new discourse has to be pursued, I would suggest that it must be pursued enthusiastically within the epistemic space that opens up (between the natural sciences and theological reflection) from a rephrased question in this regard, such as: How does the biologically shaped human propensity for religious beliefs make sense?
